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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
SERVICE PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM 
B y  Ceci l  R. Gibson and James A. Wood 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center  
SUMMARY 
A review of the 9-year development program of the Apollo service propulsion sub- 
system from the initial concept to the Apollo 11 lunar landing is given in this report .  
During late 1960, separate contractors, under the supervision of the National Aeronau- 
t ics and Space Administration, prepared feasibility studies of an advanced manned space- 
craft program. In 1961, the lunar-orbit-rendezvous mode was  selected to replace the 
direct-lunar-landing mode. By 1967, development and qualification of the service pro- 
pulsion subsystem were completed. The continued refinements and the evolution of the 
service propulsion subsystem and i t s  related assemblies were prime factors in the suc- 
cessful manned flights of the Apollo Program. 
INTRODUCTION 
This review of the Apollo service propulsion subsystem (SPS) covers the 9-year 
period from the conception of the subsystem to the Apollo 11 lunar landing. During this 
period, the program progressed from the definition phase to the hardware design phase, 
to the subsystem development and qualification phases, and, ultimately, to the flight 
phase. Because of the size of the subsystem, it w a s  not feasible to provide total 
redundancy. For this reason, the SPS had to be extremely reliable. Simplicity of de- 
sign and extensive ground testing were required in order  to achieve the desired confi- 
dence level. 
qualification phases. These problems, and the actions taken to eliminate them, a r e  
discussed in  the description of this phase of the program. 
Several problems were encountered during the development and 
In October 1960, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) se- 
lected three contractors to prepare feasibility studies of an advanced manned spacecraft 
as a par t  of the Apollo Program. Several types of propulsion systems, cryogenic pro- 
pellants, storable propellants, and solid-propellant rocket motors were studied to sup- 
port the various proposed Apollo configurations. By early 1962, the basic Apollo 
configuration and the engine subcontractor had been selected. 
The evolution of the subsystem began with the definition of design cr i ter ia  that 
would be consistent with mission requirements, reliability goals, and spacecraft-design 
concepts. The development and qualification of the subsystem were accomplished by 
developing and testing components, by testing major assemblies, and by full-scale sys-  
tem testing on propulsion test fixtures. Detailed test objectives to verify inflight sys- 
tem performance also were incorporated in  the early Apollo missions. 
Analyses that encompassed conceptual studies, weight trade-offs, configuration 
choice, size, and establishment of performance cr i ter ia  resulted in a final design defi- 
nition for the subsystem. Materials and processes were investigated to support subsys- 
tem development. In connection with the analytical studies, laboratory research was 
conducted to verify analytical techniques, to improve component design, and to resolve 
problems. Material-properties research was conducted to determine the emissivities 
of nozzle and nozzle-coating materials. In addition, nozzle-material welding techniques 
were investigated. Tube brazing and weld techniques were improved by means of 
propellant-metal compatibility studies and brazing-welding metallurgical investigations. 
Thrust-chamber ablative materials were selected after the performance of laboratory 
tests that limited the materials list before any thrust-chamber testing. Laboratory 
studies were conducted on 42 potential thrust-chamber-material samples; the studies 
included high-temperature vacuum tests  and thermal- and structural-properties 
investigations. 
Seal materials for propellant equipment were selected after investigation of elas- 
tomer and pseudoelastomer compounds to screen for  propellant compatibility, swell, 
creep, resilience, and other required seal properties. Zero-gravity propellant-motion 
problems were investigated by means of theoretical and experimental research in fluid 
mechanics. The goals of this research were new modeling and scaling techniques fo r  
earth simulation of zero-gravity effects and an improvement in  the understanding of 
fundamental phenomena. The simulation techniques and facilities that were used were 
the prime contractor drop tower (low gravity), scaled transparent tanks (one g) with 
slow-motion picture simulation of inflight real time, and the U.S. Air Force KC-135 
airplane flying laboratory. 
The command and service module (CSM) flight program was the final phase of the 
SPS development. Inflight testing of the SPS was accomplished in  sequence with the 
vehicles to produce a high-confidence, proven subsystem for the lunar-orbital- 
rendezvous mission. Because the SPS played a major role in  the achievement of crew 
safety and mission success,  an attempt to qualify the subsystem under all space- 
operational conditions w a s  made during the ground-test program. However, limitations 
in  the ground-test facilities; limited zero-gravity periods in  earthbound test vehicles; 
the impracticability of simulating the combined pressure,  temperature, and gravity 
environment; and environmental unknowns prevented complete demonstration of subsys- 
tem performance conditions before and during the early unmanned flights. Thus, the 
SPS was used conservatively early in the flight program, but the complexity of operating 
modes and of subsystem demands was increased with each flight as experience and con- 
fidence were obtained. 
DESIGN PHASE 
Design reliability was a product of simplicity. Propellants were selected on the 
basis of experience with other programs and because of propellant earth-storability , 
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hypergolicity , performance, and high-density properties. A pressure-fed engine, 
which eliminated the need for the par ts  and controls that a r e  required for pump-fed en- 
gines, was selected to decrease the operating complexity. High-pressure (4400 psia) 
helium, stored at ambient temperature and regulated to 180 psia, was selected as the 
propellant- tank pressurizing agent. An ablative thrust chamber was selected rather 
than a regeneratively cooled chamber to decrease the possibility of propellant freezing. 
Also, an increase in  the operational limits for  the propellant ratio, the propellant tem- 
peratures,  and the chamber pressure was more compatible with ablative chambers. In 
addition, studies were indicative that most propulsion-system failures were caused by 
failures of controls, valves, and solenoids rather than by failures of injectors o r  thrust 
chambers. Therefore, redundancy was used, where practical, to increase reliability 
in  these a reas .  
Approximately halfway through the SPS development program, data generated 
from an in-house-managed research and development contract were indicative that the 
SPS could supply a specific impulse of 3 to 5 seconds higher if  the oxidizer-to-fuel 
weight ratio was 1.6: 1 rather than 2:  1. The higher performance level was desirable 
to provide for the lunar module (LM) weight growth and for additional flexibility in  mis- 
sion planning. Therefore, the SPS was redesigned for  the new ratio. The 2: 1 ratio 
was used in  the Block I vehicles. The vehicles using the 1.6:l ratio were designated 
Block II. 
Block I Configuration 
The SPS Block I mission and operational requirements dictated that the subsys- 
tem consist of a helium-pressurization assembly, a propellant-supply and propellant- 
distribution assembly, a propellant-utilization and propellant-gaging assembly, a 
rocket-engine assembly, instrumentation, 
ment is shown in figure 1. 
storage tank 
Figure 1. - Service propulsion 
subsystem. 
and displays and controls. The SPS arrange- 
Helium-pressurization assembly. - 
The SPS helium-pressurization assembly 
(fig. 2) consisted of a high-pressure helium 
sGpply; two spherical helium tanks; and the 
associated pressure regulators, isolation 
valves, check valves, and pressure-relief 
valves. The tanks were connected to a 
common helium-distribution line. Two 
parallel solenoid-operated poppet valves, 
installed downstream from the helium tanks, 
isolated the helium supply when the propul- 
sion system w a s  inoperative. Pressure  was 
regulated by two pressure-regulator assem- 
blies. Each regulator assembly incorpo- 
rated a primary and a secondary regulator 
i n  series.  The primary regulator reduced 
the high upstream pressure to the down- 
stream operating pressure.  The secondary 
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Figure 2. - Service propulsion subsystem propellant feed assembly. 
regulator w a s  calibrated to regulate at  a higher pressure;  thus, the secondary regulator 
remained open when the primary regulator functioned properly. The installation of 
parallel-series check-valve assemblies downstream from the helium-pressure regula- 
to rs  prevented backflow of propellants into the pressurization system. An oxidizer- 
and a fuel-pressure-relief-valve assembly (each consisting of a relief valve, a burst  
diaphragm, and a filter screen) were provided for  the propellant-tank systems. The 
burst  diaphragms were used to isolate the valve seats  from the propellant vapors. 
Propellant supply and distribution assembly. - The propellant supply and distribu- 
tion assembly (fig. 2) contained and distributed oxidizer and fuel. The oxidizer supply 
of the assembly was contained within two cylindrical tanks that had hemispherical 
domes. The two tanks were connected in  ser ies  by means of a propellant-transfer line. 
The upstream tank was used as the storage tank; the downstream tank was  used as the 
sump tank. The oxidizer tanks contained 30 000 pounds of usable propellant, and the 
fuel tanks contained 15 000 pounds of usable propellant after allowances were made fo r  
the loading tolerances, the residuals, and the required ullage. A propellant/helium 
heat exchanger was incorporated in  each propellant line for thermal conditioning of the 
helium supply. 
Titanium was determined to be the best pressure-tank material because of its 
high strength-to-density ratio and i t s  compatibility with the propellants. Initially, the 
gross weight of the tanks was  49 850 pounds; the gross  weight was reduced to 
39 500 pounds in  July 1962 because of the change to the lunar-orbit-rendezvous mode, 
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which required less  propellant and tankage. The maximum tank pressure was 240 psig, 
and the operating-temperature limits were 104" F maximum and 44" F minimum. 
Zero-gravity expulsion techniques that were studied included the use of mechanical 
bellows, an umbrella spring-loaded bladder, full bladders, and reaction-control-engine 
ullage maneuvers. The reaction-control-engine ullage maneuver w a s  selected to settle 
the propellants for  expulsion. However, this technique necessitated the design and de- 
velopment of the propellant-retention reservoir in the sump tanks as a backup to the re-  
action control system (RCS). 
Propellant utilization and gaging system. - The propellant utilization and gaging 
system (PUGS) consisted of primary and auxiliary propellant-quantity-sensing devices, 
an electrical control unit, an oxidizer-flow-control-valve assembly, and a crew dis- 
play panel. The system w a s  used to monitor the quantities of usable propellant that 
remained in the propellant tanks so that the desired oxidizer-to-fuel ratio could be ad- 
justed manually during propellant expulsion for simultaneous depletion of the oxidizer 
and fuel. The primary quantity sensors were cylindrical capacitance probes that were 
mounted axially in  each tank. The auxiliary gaging system had impedance-type point 
sensors  coupled with a nominal-flow integrator between sensor levels. Oxidizer flow 
was controlled by means of a motor-operated, redundant, double-blade valve assembly 
that was used to provide increased, decreased, or normal oxidizer flow rates .  The 
control unit was used to compute total propellant quantities from individual tank quan- 
tities, the propellant imbalance, and the oxidizer-to-fuel ratio; also, the control unit 
continuously compared the total propellant quantities that were indicated by the primary 
and auxiliary systems. The crew display panel provided the onboard output indications 
that were required and provided the switches for use in  control functions and onboard 
testing. 
Engine assembly. - The SPS engine (fig. 3)  was a nonthrottleable, gimbaled, 
pressure-fed rocket engine that consisted of an ablative-cooled thrust chamber, a 
radiation-cooled nozzle-(extending from an a rea  ratio of approximately 6: 1 to 62.5: l), 
a bolt-on aluminum injector, a thrust and gimbal mount, a bipropellant valve, gimbal 
actuators, an electrical harness,  and propellant feedlines. The engine operated at a 
chamber pressure of 102 psia and produced a vacuum thrust of 21 500 pounds. The 
average specific impulse was 309 seconds. The engine w a s  capable of at least 36 s ta r t s  
and had an engine firing life of 500 seconds. 
Ignition occurred by means of hypergolic reaction in the thrust  chamber. Propel- 
lant flow to the thrust-chamber assembly w a s  controlled by a redundant set  of series- 
parallel  ball valves that were actuated by pneumatic pressure that was controlled by 
electrically operated solenoid valves. Gaseous nitrogen, stored in  redundant tanks, 
provided the pneumatic pressure.  
A flight combustion-stability monitor (FCSM) system was designed to monitor 
SPS engine vibrations and automatically commanded engine shutdown when unacceptable 
combustion-excited vibration conditions occurred. This system contained engine- 
mounted accelerometers and associated monitor circuits and an electronic summing 
circuit, which acted to shut down the engine. An indicator lamp in the command mod- 
ule (CM) was illuminated when a shutdown was commanded. Manual control allowed 
overriding the automatic system to res ta r t  the engine. A combustion-stability 
verification-test program was conducted to show the inherent stability characterist ics 
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Figure 3. - Service propulsion sub- 
system engine assembly. 
of the Block IT engine configuration. Suc- 
cessful completion of this test  program al- 
lowed deletion of the FCSM. 
Block I I Configuration 
The two major changes in  the Block II 
SPS were the establishment of the operating 
propellant ratio as 1.6 pounds of oxidizer 
per  pound of fuel, to provide higher engine 
specific impulse, and the reduction of the 
total onboard propellant quantity as a result  
of vehicle-trajectory changes combined with 
the improvement in engine performance. 
The changes facilitated making the propel- 
lant tanks smaller ;  and, because the 
propellant-density ratio was 1.6: 1 (oxidizer- 
to-fuel), the oxidizer and fuel tanks were 
made identical in size. The cylindrical sec- 
tion of all four tanks was shortened by ap- 
proximately 11 inches. The Block I 
diameter and the hemispherical-head de- 
sign were maintained. An additional advan- 
tage of the redesigned tanks was realized: 
the sump and storage tanks were installed 
in adjacent bays in the service module (SM), 
ra ther  than on opposite sides (as in  Block I), 
for a more desirable location of the center 
of gravity. The Block II propellant tanks 
also were designed to have a limit pressure 
of 225 psia, which was a reduction from the 
Block I value of 240 psia. This change facilitated further reduction of the tank wall 
thicknesses. To reduce the tank limit pressure to  225 psia and yet maintain the Block I 
permissible ullage-pressure-rise design limit of 213 psia,  a narrow-range relief de- 
vice was developed for use on Block 11 spacecraft. 
Because l e s s  propellant w a s  expelled by the Block 11 pressurization equipment, 
l ess  helium was required. The design loading pressure  w a s  reduced to a value that 
corresponded to the new helium quantity, and the wall thickness was reduced to that 
thickness which was required fo r  the lower loading pressure;  thus, an additional 
weight saving was achieved. 
DEVELOPMENT AND QUAL1 FICATION PHASE 
The time-sequenced planning and results that were used in the testing of each 
major component and assembly of the subsystem a r e  discussed i n  this section. 
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Component Develop men t and Qual i f i  catio n 
Component development was conducted at the plant of each subcontractor. Com- 
ponent compliance with design cr i ter ia  and the determination of optimum component 
configurations were the purposes of the effort. 
For  most components, the flight phase started before the development and quali- 
fication phase was complete. This fact made it  necessary to qualify hardware specifi- 
cally for the first flight and to delay the more general overstress-type tes ts  until final 
hardware designs were completed. A chronological description of the development and 
qualification of each component in  the engine assembly, propellant-supply assembly, 
and pressurization assembly is given in  the following sections. 
Engine assembly. - The SPS engine (fig. 3)  design and development effort was 
started by the subcontractor April 9, 1962. The effort that was contracted originally 
covered the design and development of the SPS engine, preliminary flight-rating tests,  
and the delivery of two mockups, five prequalified engines, seven qualified engines, 
spare  par ts  to support the delivered engines, and some ground-support equipment (GSE). 
The initial design effort was concentrated on layouts of the overall engine concept 
and on the interfaces with the spacecraft. By August 1962, the design definition had 
progressed sufficiently to permit the s tar t  of fabrication of the hard mockup engine 
components. The design review of this mockup was completed, and the mockup was 
delivered in  November 1962. 
Throughout the engine development and qualification phase, many configuration 
changes occurred in  both the Block I and Block I1 engines as a result  of knowledge 
gained in  the test programs. Engine-development testing was conducted at the con- 
t ractor  sea-level test facility at Sacramento, California, and at the simulated-altitude 
test  facility at the Arnold Engineering and Development Center (AEDC), Tullahoma, 
Tennessee. One of the more significant changes resulted in the incorporation of a 
baffled injector to reduce the r isk of combustion instability. Both baffled and unbaffled 
injectors were used in  the development program. The baffled injector is shown in fig- 
u r e  4. The requirements for the engine to damp pressure oscillations and the poor test  
experience with unbaffled injectors necessitated the use of a baffle to damp pressure 
oscillations in  the combustion chamber. Many tes ts  included the use of explosive 
charges in  the combustion chamber during engine firings to verify the damping capa- 
bility of the engine. 
The Block I test  program, performed at the contractor facility, consisted of ex- 
tensive firing of the injector as a component and firing in conjunction with other engine 
components. The sea-level qualification-test program consisted of firing the engine 
assembly 56 t imes.  The altitude testing at the AEDC consisted of three test  phases: 
development, prequalification, and qualification testing. 
The first fireable test  engine (SN 003) was shipped to the AEDC in May 1963 fo r  
initiation of the phase I program. Two additional SPS engines (SN 004 and SN 008) were 
shipped to the AEDC in  September and November 1963. Simulated-altitude testing began 
with engine SN 003 on June 26, 1963. An engine firing of approximately 5 seconds re-  
sulted in  shutdown because of the collapse of the titanium nozzle extension, which was 
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Figure 4. - Service propulsion subsystem engine baffled injector. 
caused by excessive back pressure in  the test cell .  High-frequency chamber-pressure 
oscillations, which occurred during the acceptance testing of engine SN 004 at  the sub- 
contractor plant, were attributed to incomplete air removal f rom the engine oxidizer 
circuit. To ensure removal of all gas from the oxidizer circuit, the engine-air-bleed 
system on the engines was  increased in size f rom 0.25 to 0.50 inch, and the required 
air-bleed t imes were lengthened for  the phase I testing. 
Two engines (SN 009 and SN 011) were used for the phase I1 prequalification test- 
ing at the AEDC. The f i r s t  altitude-test-cell f i r ing involved engine SN 009; the test  
was completed in  December 1964. In January 1965, because of inadvertent operation 
of the test  stand during stand maintenance, the engine sustained nozzle and chamber 
damage. No corrective action regarding engine design or  operation w a s  required be- 
cause the damage w a s  attributed to test-stand problems. The second engine (SN 011) 
was equipped with a baffled injector that was designed to minimize combustion instabil- 
ity. By June 1965, the two engines had completed 101 tes ts ,  for a total f ir ing time of 
2581 seconds. The tes ts  were used to evaluate engine operation and performance over 
a wide range of chamber pressures  and propellant mixtures. Simulated-altitude gim- 
baling of the engine was accomplished in March 1965 on engine SN 009 and was repeated 
successfully on engine SN 011 in  April 1965. 
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Engine SN 009, retrofitted with the f i r s t  pneumatically actuated valve, was tested 
at simulated altitudes; the engine completed 27 tes ts  (408 seconds of firing time) in  
June 1965. The chamber forward flange failed during the last test, which resulted in 
the loss of the chamber and nozzle extension. The chamber-flange failure occurred 
again on the second engine (SN 011) in  July 1965. The failure occurred on the 27th test  
after 333 seconds of firing time. Both engines sustained extensive damage and were re- 
turned to the subcontractor. The failures were caused by shrinkage of the chamber 
ablative liner; shrinkage occurred during cooldown after exposure to hot firing condi- 
tions. This shrinkage caused the opening of a gap at the chamber-to-injector flange 
joint, allowing circulation of the combustion gasses in  the joint, subsequent charring 
of the chamber, and overheating of the chamber-to-injector flange. Several firing cy- 
c les  with the associated heating and cooldown of the chamber and flange joint caused 
degradation of the joint to the point of failure by means of separation. The chamber 
was redesigned by step machining the outer liner surface and by adding a mechanical 
lockring. This eliminated the susceptibility to  thermal cycling. Burn-time and coast- 
time limitations were imposed on flight engines that were not retrofitted with the new 
chamber. 
Three engines completed the phase 111 simulated-altitude qualification testing; 
130 firings were made for  an accumulated duration of 3599 seconds. During the f i r s t  
test  se r ies  of the third engine, severe chamber damage occurred that was attributed to 
vacuum-grease contamination of the fuel. This contamination caused overheating and 
warpage of the injector flange, which resulted in burn through at the injector-flange-to- 
chamber joint on the second test ser ies .  The injector was replaced, and the last two 
test  se r ies  were completed satisfactorily. The contamination problem was eliminated 
through cleanliness controls during subsequent testing. 
Concurrent with the phase I to 111 AEDC test program, extensive development 
testing was accomplished at the subcontractor sea-level test  facility to establish com- 
patibility of engine components and for selection of the individual components to be used. 
Engine SN 023 completed acceptance testing in May 1965, and engine SN 021 completed 
acceptance testing in July 1965. As a result of the chamber burn-through problem at 
the AEDC, the engines were retrofitted with the redesigned chamber. Qualification 
testing was resumed, and the f i r s t  sea-level qualification-test se r ies  was completed on 
engine SN 022 in November 1965. Two additional test series were cnrnpleted by Decem- 
ber 28, 1965; this marked the satisfactory completion of the sea-level qualification 
testing. A total of 56 tes t s  was performed, representing 1518 seconds of firing time. 
Block I flight engines, which were of the same configuration as the qualification 
engines, were processed through a standard test cycle that consisted of component ac- 
ceptance tests, engine assembly acceptance firing, and postfire testing. 
The Block I1 engine-test program consisted of 392 development-test firings at the 
subcontractor sea-level facility and three test  phases performed under simulated- 
altitude conditions (a total of 663 firings) at the AEDC. In May 1966, the first Block I1 
development testing under simulated altitude was conducted (phase N). Forty-nine 
tests were performed, and 810 seconds of firing time were accumulated. Phase IV 
testing involved two engines; 265 tes ts  were performed, and 6704 seconds of firing time 
were accumulated. 
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Phase V, which was  .simulated-altitude qualification testing that consisted of six 
test ser ies ,  began November 18, 1966, and was completed in  February 1967. A second 
engine was used for the last two ser ies ;  108 tes ts  were performed and 4521 seconds of 
firing time were accumulated without unscheduled interruptions. Engine operation was 
evaluated over the extreme range of thrust-chamber pressures ,  propellant ratios, 
firing durations, and propellant temperatures. One significant problem was encoun- 
tered: leakage of the ball-valve seals  was noted after testing. Subsequently, the sekls 
were redesigned to provide a second seal fo r  each ball, and the seal material was 
changed from TFE Teflon to a glass-filled Teflon (BF-1 Blue Teflon) seal.  
In addition to the ball-valve seal-leakage problem that was encountered during 
phase V testing, overboard leakage of gaseous nitrogen through the actuator piston w a s  
possible because of shrinkage of the Delrin pistons at temperatures below 30' F. To 
eliminate th i s  problem, the piston material was changed to aluminum. The phase VI 
testing, which consisted of 222 firings, was designed to qualify the design changes that 
were made to eliminate these problems and to evaluate the magnitude of chamber- 
pressure overshoots by the use of high-response instrumentation. 
The ball-valve seal-leakage problem was not eliminated completely by the rede- 
sign, but the resulting total leakage rate was determined to be acceptable for flight use. 
The Delrin piston had been replaced with an aluminum piston and a Delrin sliding sur-  
face; the replacement was satisfactory. The chamber-pressure-overshoot evaluation 
was indicative that excessive pressure spikes may result  from igniting the engine by 
opening both the redundant flow paths simultaneously. A revised operating require- 
ment, the use of only one flow path to s tar t  the engine, was incorporated for flight use. 
The primary basis for  qualification of the engine was the simulated-altitude testing con- 
ducted at the AEDC. The tests accomplished on the final (Block II) configuration a r e  
summarized in  table I. The maturity and reliability of the engine design were estab- 
lished through the number of firings conducted and the conditions simulated. 
Propellant utilization and gaging system. - During the development and qualifi- 
cation testing of the PUGS, several  design changes were needed to eliminate discrep- 
ancies. However, other problems associated with the system also resulted from 
interactions between the PUGS and the SPS tanking arrangement. 
In the first generation of control units, the connector panel was integrated with 
the control-unit housing. Thus, technicians had to solder approximately 400 wires in  
a limited space. Solder inspection was difficult because only one row of solder cups 
per  connector could be seen at any one time and some solder cups had more than one 
wire. To eliminate this problem, the control unit was redesigned and the connector 
panel was separated from the housing. Therefore, the connectors were wired in a 
separate subassembly, allowing adequate inspection. 
The original design for overload protection involved the use of fuses packaged in  
the modules. This method w a s  costly because the module had to be unwired, depotted, 
repotted, and reinstalled when a fuse was blown. As a result ,  a design change was 
made so that all fuses were relocated on an accessible terminal board. This reduced 
the time and cost required to repair  units with blown fuses. 
Several other operating problems were noted during subsystem development test- 
ing at the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) and during the flights. A propellant 
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bias that resulted in off-nominal fuel flow was detected by means of the PUGS during 
the early flights. Initially, it was believed to  be a gaging problem, but later i t  was es- 
tablished a s  an increased fuel-flow rate over the rate that w a s  predicted based on 
ground tests. This phenomenon could not be reproduced in  helium-saturation ground 
tests. The propellant-utilization (PU) valve was used in  the increased oxidizer flow 
position to eliminate most of the flow imbalance until engine reorificing eliminated the 
bias. 
Another bias i n  both fuel and oxidizer flow w a s  observed on the spacecraft 001 
(SC 001) tests at the WSTF and on early flights. The propellant level in  the cylindrical 
tube, which houses the gaging probes in  the sump tanks, was lower under flow condi- 
tions than was the level of the bulk propellant in the tanks. This inequality resulted 
from a Bernoulli effect that w a s  caused by propellant flowing out of the bottom of the 
tank. Flow dividers were added in  the retention reservoir to eliminate this problem. 
Two other e r r o r s  associated witin the PUGS have been identified mc! a r e  accounted 
for i n  preflight predictions of propellant usage. One e r ro r  resulted from absorption of 
helium from the ullage of the sump tank, which allowed the propellant level to rise 
above the top of the gage. This e r r o r  was compensated for  operationally. The other 
e r r o r  resulted from an offset calibration of the oxidizer-storage-tank probe, which was 
necessary to eliminate a residual signal from the empty storage tank. The probe offset 
calibration is incorporated during gaging system checkout pr ior  to servicing. This 
e r r o r  is also compensated for operationally. 
Flight experience also was indicative that approximately 25 seconds of engine op- 
eration are  required to settle propellants in  the gaging probe housings. This circum- 
stance caused activation of the caution and warning system, indicating a critically 
unbalanced condition between the remaining fuel and oxidizer quantities during the 
Apollo 9 mission. The design estimate of settling time required was approximately 
4 seconds. The caution and warning system was designed to be activated approximately 
5 seconds after ignition, and the system compared the quantity of fuel and oxidizer that 
remained. The caution and warning activation system was revised to delete the PUGS 
comparison and thus eliminate erroneous activation of the caution and warning system. 
The auxiliary gaging system also failed on several  flight vehicles during ground 
checkout. Leakage of conductive fuel vapor into the sealed electronic package of the 
fuel probe resulted in  shorting of the point-sensor electronic circuits. This problem 
was not eliminated because of the significant cost and schedule impact and the lack of 
criticality of the auxiliary portion of the gaging system. The auxiliary system was used 
only if the primary system failed. Also, other methods were available to establish on- 
board quantities such as acceleration, helium usage versus  burn time, and predicted 
propellant flow rate  times burn time. 
Propellant-distribution assembly. - The Block I propellant-tank qualification test 
began in  October 1963. Four fuel tanks and four oxidizer tanks were used to qualify 
the propellant tanks. The major problems that were encountered during qualification 
testing are  described as follows. 
In October 1963, after proof-pressure testing at 320 psig for 30 minutes, the 
number 1 fuel tank had a local meridional crack in the lower dome section just below 
the weld joint. The crack in  the number 1 fuel tank was caused by s t r e s s  corrosion 
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that resulted from a localized contaminant. Manufacturing processes were revised to 
eliminate the use of materials containing halogens from processes at temperatures 
greater than 500" F. The cracked lower dome and cylinder were replaced; subse- 
quently, the tank w a s  tested successfully. 
In March 1964, a partial vacuum that w a s  applied inadvertently to a fuel tank 
caused the tank to buckle. The tank returned to acceptable dimensions after the vacuum 
was released. The tank was  returned to the qualification program; no damage was 
noted after a thorough inspection. The test stand and procedures were modified to pre- 
vent a recurrence of the problem. The Block I qualification testing w a s  completed in  
January 1965. 
Subsequent s t r e s s  corrosion failures in RCS oxidizer tanks and in one of the 
spacecraft 01 7 oxidizer tanks required additional SPS tank-compatibility tests. These 
failures were caused by s t r e s s  corrosion resulting from a process change in the manu- 
facturing of nitrogen tetroxide (N204). It was determined that the use of additives to 
increase the f r ee  nitrous oxide content of the oxidizer resulted in  satisfactory compati- 
bility with the tank material. All  of the N 0 that w a s  used in the Apollo vehicles had 2 4  
to meet the nitrous oxide content requirement. A Block I SPS propellant tank was sub- 
jected to an 80-day compatibility test to demonstrate satisfactory results. 
During the flight of spacecraft 009 (SC 009) February 26, 1966, the transfer line 
in the reservoir failed, causing helium to be ingested into the SPS engine, which re- 
sulted in  loss of thrust. The reservoir was modified by strengthening the standpipe 
support brackets and weld joints and was recertified by means of vibration testing dur- 
ing the Block I1 propellant-tank qualification. After completion of the Block I1 qualifi- 
cation test ,  the propellant-retention reservoir had cracks in  each of six welds that 
connect the outlet ports to the main body of the reservoir.  Truck transportation of the 
tanks with the retention reservoir installed was  done only on the qualification-test tanks 
because the reservoirs  were installed at the prime contractor facility. The manufac- 
turer  indicated that the cracks could have occurred during transportation of the unit; 
however, the retention reservoir had not been disassembled for  inspection between in- 
termediate stages of testing, and the cracks could not be definitely attributed to trans- 
portation. Therefore, a Block I and II retention-reservoir qualification retest  was 
conducted to verify the integrity of the crossover-tube welds in  the environmental con- 
ditions that the retention reservoir would undergo during boost and space flight. By 
means of these tests,  the structural  integrity of the retention reservoir was shown. 
Helium-pressurization assembly. - Qualification testing of the first helium tank 
began in  October 1963 and was  completed in  April 1965. A major problem was encoun- 
tered when qualification-tank units three and four burst  at less than the design burst 
pressure.  By means of a design review, i t  was determined that the cause of failure 
w a s  excessive stress concentration in  a heavy girth-weld bead. Removal of the weld 
bead allowed the weld joint to work in  unison with the membrane during cycling. Two 
tanks f rom which the weld bead was removed were added to the qualification-test pro- 
gram; therefore, the program w a s  completed successfully. 
Qualification testing for Block I regulators w a s  performed from July 1 to Novem- 
ber 3, 1965. Although the two units met the qualification-test requirements, the 
13 
primary stage of the class IV regulator leaked excessively after endurance-cycle tests. 
A higher internal-leakage-specification limit was accepted because the leakage through 
the redundant secondary stage was less than the required limit. Block 11 regulators 
completed the qualification-test program satisfactorily. 
The helium check valves were redesigned after the Block I test program to reduce 
high leakage characteristics. The primary change was the deletion of Teflon poppet 
seats and the incorporation of Resistazine 88 as the poppet material on the oxidizer 
valve to comply with leakage requirements of 1.08 scc/hr . Qualification testing w a s  
completed on the helium-isolation valves without major redesigns. 
Subsystem Tests 
During the development of the SPS, a comprehensive ground-test program was 
conducted at the WSTF. A high level of confidence in the reliability of the basic, simple 
configuration of the SPS resulted from these tests.  Various portions of the test program 
a re  summarized according to the test vehicle. 
From September 1964 to September 1965, tests were conducted at the WSTF using 
a Block I test fixture. The test rig consisted of a boilerplate configuration that simu- 
lated the spacecraft propellant-line sizes and routing and that had the necessary instru- 
mentation and safety provisions that were required for static-test operations. 
The initial test ser ies  was  conducted using a preprototype engine and off-the- 
shelf hardware i n  the propellant and helium-pressurization systems to establish opera- 
tional procedures for fluid servicing and to evaluate system-operating characteristics 
until flight components were available. Later, the helium-pressurization system was  
updated to the flight configuration. The engine was updated continually throughout the 
program; a Block I qualification engine was  installed for the final test ser ies .  
Two injector failures occurred during the fourth series of tests.  In both cases ,  
posttest inspections were indicative that the hub of the injector baffle had separated 
from the baffle. This problem was caused by afterburning of propellants in the injec- 
tor .  *The injector w a s  purged with nitrogen in  all subsequent SPS ground tes ts  to re- 
duce the thermal stress caused by burning of residual propellants i n  the baffle. 
In preparation for  Block I1 testing, the Block I test fixture w a s  modified exten- 
sively to a Block I1 configuration. The major differences between the flight configura- 
tion and the test configuration a r e  listed as follows. 
1. Propellant tanks : Test-article propellant-storage and sump tanks were boil- 
erplate, but the wetted surfaces were flight configuration. 
2. Helium-storage tanks: The helium supply for phases I and I1 and for series I 
and 11 of phase 111 was  provided by nonflight-configuration external GSE. Series I11 
and IV of phase III t a d  flight-configured Block I helium-storage tanks. 
The Block I1 SPS test program that w a s  conducted at the WSTF began in Novem- 
ber 1966 and was completed in April 1969. The program consisted of sea-level tests 
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that were conducted in  three phases. Phase I consisted of eight test ser ies ;  the objec- 
tives were system verification and performance demonstration under nominal, off - 
nominal, and malfunction conditions. Phase I1 consisted of seven test series;  the 
objectives were to show lunar-mission performance at normal and various abnormal 
conditions. Another objective was to evaluate the improved (double seal) SPS engine 
bipropellant configuration. The final test phase, phase JJI, consisted of four test series; 
the objectives were to investigate SPS performance under extreme off-limit conditions, 
to investigate flight anomalies, and to perform an additional evaluation of the engine 
bipropellant-valve double-seal configuration. The Block I1 SPS test program consisted 
of 650 test firings that had a total firing time of 20 478 seconds. A summary of this 
program is contained in  table 11. 
TABLE II.- BLOCK II WSTF TEST SUMMARY 
Test phase 
and date 
Phase I 
Nov. 15, 1966 to 
June 7, 1967 
Phase Il 
July 13, 1967 to 
Apr. 3, 1968 
Phase III 
May 2, 1968 to 
Apr. 30, 1969 
Objectives 
System evaluation and characterization 
at  nominal, off-limit, and malfunc- 
tion conditions 
)emonstrate system operation for 
CSM 101 (Apollo 7) mission duty 
cycle 
Demonstrate lunar-mission perform- 
ance at nominal, off-limit, and mal- 
function conditions 
Evaluate ball valve double-seal ( 1 4 )  
configuration 
Evaluate PUGS performance at nominal 
Demonstrate system operation for 
and off-nominal conditions 
CSM 101 (Apollo 7) 
[mrestigate SPS operation under ex- 
treme off-limit conditions and multi- 
ple malfunctions 
Perform additional lunar and SC 101 
mission simulations 
hraluate ball valve (1-E) configuration 
Investigate PUGS flight anomalies 
Test 
aeries 
I 
11 
III 
N 
V 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
- 
I 
II 
m. 
N 
V 
VI 
VII 
- 
I 
II 
m 
nr 
- 
!lumber 
of test 
firings 
36 
47 
30 
56 
45 
36 
54 
28 
‘332 
15 
17 
18 
17 
17 
56 
26 
%66 
-
-
17 
50 
51 
34 
a152 
b850 
-
-
Firing 
time, 
sec 
825.51 
917.84 
805.47 
905.50 
869.63 
896.82 
1016.09 
975.19 
a7 212.05 
1 193.69 
1210.41 
1016.90 
1 207.75 
1 210.62 
947.45 
553.03 
a7 339.85 
1497.60 
909.07 
1569.35 
1 950.72 
a5 926.74 
b20 478.64 
Test conditions 
rempfrature, 
F 
70 
40 to 70 
70 
50 to 100 
50 to 70 
70 to 100 
45 to 70 
70 to 100 
70 
70 
70 
70 to 100 
45 to 70 
70 
70 
70 
70 to 105 
35 to 70 
40 to 70 
Oxidizer and 
fuel ullage 
Jressure, psia 
175 
175 
175 
175 to 205 
179 to 187 
179 
100 to 179 
179 
~ 
179 
173 
197 
170 to 190 
179 
70 to 179 
142 to 179 
68 to 179 
179 
165 to 179 
179 
aTest-phase total. 
bTest-program total. . .  
I ntegrated Systems Tests 
The SPS subsystem demonstration tes t s  were conducted on SC 001, which included 
a flight-type SM, at the WSTF from February 5, 1965, to September 7, 1966. The SPS 
that was installed in  SC 001 was identical functionally to the Block I flight systems ex- 
cept for minor modifications that were required for  ground testing and a more detailed 
instrumentation system. The SC 001 SPS was updated as required to maintain the 
Block I configuration. 
A special test  was  initiated to investigate the flight anomaly that was observed 
during the SC 003 flight. Before this test ,  the oxidizer sump-tank standpipe was modi- 
fied to simulate the failed transfer line in  SC 009. The results of this test  led to a 
structural improvement in  the propellant-transfer lines. A spacecraft 011 (SC 011) 
mission duty cycle was conducted to evaluate system characteristics that resulted f rom 
the reworked transfer lines. 
System operational characteristics of the SPS during nominal and off -limit condi- 
tions were demonstrated successfully by SC 001 tests.  These tes t s  included firings that 
ranged in duration from 23 to 600 seconds; dual- and single-engine bipropellant-valve 
operation; engine firings at minimum expected propellant and hardware temperatures; 
propellant-depletion firings; engine operation with a high engine-valve actuation pres- 
sure  (190 psig); engine s ta r t s  with propellant only in the retention reservoirs ;  rapid 
restar t  firings; chamber-pressure-decay firings at different propellant loads; engine 
operation with and without postfire injector purges; system operation with tank ullage 
pressures of 225 psia; simulated failures of individual engine-valve banks during 
steady-state operation; P U  valve cycling during steady-state operation; firings during 
which "zero" propellant imbalance was  maintained by means of cycling the P U  valve; 
system operation using fuel-cell power only; and sinusoidal and step gimbaling during 
engine-start transients and steady-state operation. 
Before the flight of AS-201 (SC 009), the SM was static fired at the NASA John F. 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) launch pad 16 in  November 1965. Before the firing, the 
oxidizer sump-tank standpipe leaked propellant into the transfer line and storage tank. 
It was concluded that a maximum of 230 pounds of propellant would leak into the storage 
tank. A shift of this magnitude would not cause a significant change in  center-of-gravity 
location. The condition was waived because the engine operated satisfactorily during 
the test. This w a s  the only Block I flight vehicle that was subjected to a static firing 
(see discussion of SC 009 flight). 
A static firing of the first Block 11 SPS (spacecraft 101) had been planned. To ex- 
pedite the launch schedule of spacecraft 101 (SC 101) by approximately 30 days, it was 
decided to static fire spacecraft 102 (SC 102) instead, decontaminate it, and return it 
to the production cycle. This was considered acceptable and desirable because the two 
spacecraft were identical, and SC 101 would not be degraded because of propellant ex- 
posure. The general objective of the SC 102 test program was to verify that the Block I1 
SPS was ready €or flight. To accomplish this, certain specific objectives were manda- 
tory and were completed successfully. 
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Fl ight-Simulat ion Tests 
Under simulated mission conditions, the spacecraft 008 (SC 008) SPS was evalu- 
ated during the thermal-vacuum-test program. The program contained provisions for 
verification that the subsystem could withstand the environments to which it would be 
exposed during the flight phase. The program was conducted in the Space Environment 
Simulation Laboratory at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC), formerly the 
Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), with simulated propellants. Data were gathered to 
determine the heat balance and the equilibrium-temperature distributions and to evalu- 
ate the effects of cyclic heating and cooling on the operation of the subsystem. 
In August 1966, the f i r s t  two tes ts  were conducted but were invalid for the SPS. 
Flight-type heaters on the engine bipropellant valve were not connected, and the heaters 
on the engine-gimbal-ring brackets were connected so that the primary and redundant 
heaters were operated simultaneously. These discrepancies were corrected for  the 
third test ,  and additional changes were made to bring the SPS configuration up to the 
spacecraft 012 (SC 012) configuration (Apollo 1). These changes consisted of insulating 
the system feedlines, adding flight-type heaters to the system feedlines, and placing 
temperature sensors  i n  the locations that were planned for use on SC 012. 
Similarly, in June 1968, spacecraft 2TV-1 was used to evaluate operation of the 
Block II CSM in  a simulated thermal-vacuum environment. Two test  objectives were 
applicable to the SPS. The first objective w a s  to determine the SPS engine-temperature- 
decline ra te  during a cold soak. The second objective was to establish the ability of the 
SPS engine thermal control subsystem heaters to maintain temperatures satisfactorily 
when exposed to a simulated side sun. The data from these tes ts  were used to update 
the computer thermal model, which was used to predict SPS engine temperatures for  
the Block 11 missions. Subsequent flights resu€ted in verification that the SPS thermal 
control system satisfactorily maintained critical points within the established tempera- 
ture  limits. 
SUBSYSTEM FLI GHT RESULTS 
Up to and including the lunar landing (Apollo ll), nine flights had involved the use  
of the SPS. Four of the systems were of the Block I configuration; five systems were 
of the Block I1 configuration. All Block I flights were unmanned, and all Block 11 flights 
were manned. 
Block I Fl ights 
Mission AS-201 (SC 009). - Two SPS firings were planned. Performance was ac- 
ceptable for  the first 70 seconds of the 180 seconds of firing that were scheduled for the 
first firing. At that time, engine-chamber pressure began a gradual decay and was ap- 
proximately 70 percent at SPS shutdown. The shutdown was initiated by the control- 
programer backup command based on elapsed firing time. As a result  of the degraded 
performance after the first 70 seconds, approximately 20 percent of the planned delta 
velocity was not achieved. At shutdown, oxidizer-tank pressure unexpectedly dropped 
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approximately 17 psi. Errat ic  chamber pressure was noted during the s tar t  of the sec- 
ond firing; stabilized burning was not achieved during the planned 20-second burn. The 
engine did appear to be recovering f rom the effects of helium ingestion before shutdown. 
Because the fuel-systems performance was either normal o r  was as would be ex- 
pected as a result  of the change in  chamber pressure,  the initial malfunction analysis 
was indicative that the probable malfunction modes were confined to the oxidizer sys- 
tem. Also, it was concluded that helium ingestion into the dngine and two-phase flow 
(gas and liquid) between the sump and storage tanks had occurred. Scale-model testing 
of the oxidizer tank and retention reservoir  at the JSC and a full-scale test at the WSTF 
(SC 001) were indicative that the probable failure mode was a leak in  the oxidizer- 
transfer line inside the retention reservoir as discussed previously. 
Mission AS-202 (SC 011).- Mission AS-202 was the second flight test of the SPS. 
The primary test objectives were to verify the SPS standpipe fix by means of a minimum 
firing of 198 seconds and to demonstrate multiple SPS res ta r t s  (at least three firings of 
at least 3-second duration at 10-second intervals). Secondary test  objectives were to 
determine long-firing (approximately 200 seconds) SPS performance (including shutdown 
transient characteristics) and to obtain data on SPS engine-firing stability. All objec- 
tives were met. 
Apollo 4 (SC 017). - The Apollo 4 mission included the third flight test of the SPS. 
The primary SPS test  objectives were to demonstrate a satisfactory s tar t  without an 
RCS settling maneuver and to determine SPS performance during a long-duration burn. 
Both objectives were met. The SPS operated nominally during both firings. During 
propellant crossover,  the engine-inlet pressure and chamber pressure increased as 
was expected; the pressures  were steady throughout the firing. The general effects 
of propellant crossover were as expected. 
Apollo 6 (SC 020). - Essentially, the SPS mission objectives were the same as for 
the Apollo 4 mission.' Because of the inability t2 res ta r t  the S-IVB stage, the SPS was 
used to transfer the CM from an earth-parking orbit to the highly elliptical earth- 
intersecting orbit that was needed to satisfy entry conditions for  the CM heat shield 
entry test. The objectives of satisfactory SPS operation and a no-ullage s tar t  were ac- 
complished. In addition to these objectives, this firing was the f i r s t  in  which the SPS 
demonstrated the firing-duration capability that w a s  needed to inser t  the CSM into a 
lunar orbit. 
Engine performance was  satisfactory except for an overshoot in  chamber pres- 
sure  during engine s tar t .  All other engine-transient cr i ter ia  were met. For the 
Apollo 4 and 6 missions, the chamber-pressure transducer had been mounted on a 
2-inch adapter to reduce the thermal effects that had caused an erroneous indication 
of chamber-pressure drift. The overshoot noted with the new adapter was significantly 
higher than with previous adapters. A special se r ies  of tes ts  involving the use  of high- 
resolution instrumentation was scheduled at  the AEDC to determine if  the overshoot 
was caused partially by instrumentation e r r o r .  It was determined that thrust-chamber- 
pressure overshoots were reduced significantly if the engine firings were initiated using 
a single bank of ball valves. It became standard operating procedure to s ta r t  each 
firing i n  the single-bank mode. If the burn was  scheduled to be longer than 6 seconds, 
the redundant bank was opened approximately 3 seconds after ignition. 
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Block I I Flights 
Five manned Apollo Block I1 missions were accomplished up to and including the 
Apollo 11 lunar-landing mission. The SPS performance on these missions is discussed 
as follows . 
Apollo 7 mission. - The Apollo 7 mission was the first mission on which the 
Block 11 SPS was flight tested. As w a s  planned, there were eight firings of the SPS en- 
gines. The four primary objectives related to the SPS were minimum-impulse burn, 
perf ormance, primary/auxiliary propellant- gaging system, and thermal control. All 
objectives were met. 
Apollo 8 mission. - The Apollo 8 mission was in  jeopardy after the f i rs t  SPS burn, 
which was a midcourse correction. A momentary drop in  chamber pressure was ob- 
served at the start of the f i r s t  burn. This drop was attributed to the presence of a gas 
bubble in  the oxidizer feedline. The gas was determined to  be trapped helium that re- 
sulted from an inadequate engine-oxidizer bleed during preflight servicing. After ex- 
tensive discussions and analysis by ground-based personnel, the decision was made to 
continue the mission. Two key i tems were important in  the real-time decision to con- 
tinue this mission, which was the first attempt to leave earth and orbit the moon with 
a manned spacecraft. Telemetry data from the AS-201 mission, in which the engine 
also had sustained some helium ingestion, and data from ground tes ts ,  in  which helium 
ingestion occurred, were compared with telemetry data to establish the signature t race  
in  chamber pressure of a small  amount of helium ingestion. Recordings of voice-track 
tapes f rom the Apollo 8 loading operations at the KSC were indicative that the engine 
feedlines had not been bled properly to remove the helium in  the high point of the line. 
With this evidence, the cause of the. chamber-pressure anomaly was established, and 
the required confidence that the engine was not damaged was provided. 
During the early portion of translunar coast, a drop of approximately 7 psi was 
noted in  the SPS oxidizer-tank pressure.  It is believed that the pressure decrease was 
caused by helium absorption; the decrease stopped when the oxidizer apparently became 
saturated. 
The engine was started on all maneuvers by the use of only one of two redundant 
s e t s  of valves in  the engine bipropellant-valve assembly. This procedure was instituted 
to decrease the initial chamber-pressure and thrust-level overshoot, which a r e  charac.- 
ter is t ics  of a start with both valve sets open. A noticeable decrease in  the overshoot 
magnitude was achieved. During the lunar-orbit-insertion (LOI) and transearth- 
injection maneuvers, the redundant-valve set  was opened approximately 3 seconds after 
ignition to increase the operational reliability for  the remainder of the firing in case one 
of the valve sets should close. 
Apollo 9 mission.- The Apollo 9 mission involved both the CSM and LM. The 
fifth SPS firing was made after a docked L M  descent-engine firing of approximately 
372 seconds duration. Preflight analyses indicated that, when a descent-engine firing 
was performed with the spacecraft docked, a negative acceleration greater  than 
2 0 .1  ft/sec would result. This acceleration could cause depletion of the propellant 
captured by the SPS sump-tank retaining screens. Although the retention reservoir 
would still remain full, some helium could be trapped and ingested into the engine 
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during a subsequent SPS firing. However, after the docked descent-engine firing, all 
SPS firings were normal and smooth, indicating that no significant quantity of helium 
had been ingested. 
Apollo 10 mission.- One of the most significant changes in  the Apollo 10 SPS was 
the addition of s t r ip  heaters in  the propellant-distribution lines that ran from the tank 
outlets to the bipropellant valves. The s t r ip  heaters provided a method of maintaining 
propellant temperatures above the 30" F minimum allowance in  a deep space environ- 
ment to prevent freezing of propellants in  the feedlines. The SPS performance was 
satisfactory during each of the five maneuvers, and the total firing time was 545 sec- 
onds. The longest engine firing was the 356-second burn on the lunar-orbit-insertion 
maneuver. The fourth and fifth SPS maneuvers, which occurred after depletion of the 
storage tanks, were preceded by a plus-X RCS translation to settle the propellants. 
Al l  firings were conducted under automatic control. 
Apollo 11 mission.- The SPS performance was satisfactory during each of the 
five maneuvers; the total firing time was  531.9 seconds. The longest engine firing w a s  
357.5 seconds during the lunar-orbit-insertion maneuver. The fourth and fifth SPS 
firings were preceded by a plus-X RCS translation to sett le propellant, and all firings 
were conducted under automatic control. The steady-state performance during all 
firings was satisfactory. The steady-state pressure data were indicative of essentially 
nominal performance; however, gaging-system data were indicative of a propellant 
flow ratio of 1.55: 1, ra ther  than the expected propellant-ratio range of 1.60: 1 to 
1.61: 1. The lower than expected mixture ratio decreased the amount of propellant 
available for velocity changes. One SPS anomaly occurred during the LO1 burn. An 
abnormal pressure decay was noted in the secondary gaseous nitrogen (GN2) supply, 
indicating a leak. The decay ceased at  engine shutdown, and no additional decay w a s  
noted. The leakage w a s  attributed to contamination on the seat of the GN2 actuator 
solenoid valve. Fi l ters  were incorporated to prevent recurrence of this problem on 
subsequent spacecraft. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The program that was developed to meet the service propulsion subsystem re- 
quirements lasted 92 months, f rom the time that the prime contractor was given con- 
t ract  go-ahead until the Apollo 11 manned lunar landing. During this period, nine 
flights were completed successfully, and all of the original requirements were met. 
The program necessitated the use of a prime contractor, 13 major subcontractors, 
approximately 500 vendors and suppliers, and two major Government-owned test  
f aci li ti es  . 
Although several significant events occurred during the development phase, the 
point at which the program began to reach maturity was on November 21, 1964, when 
it was decided to initiate a Block I1 (lunar landing) service propulsion subsystem con- 
figuration. By this time, most of the technical problems had been identified or  at least  
were understood to the point that designs were available f o r  incorporation into the sub- 
system. However, schedules f o r  a research program in which the problems a r e  un- 
known usually have to be modified as the program proceeds. The service propulsion 
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system program was no exception. During 1965, the most critical period of develop- 
ment occurred when component-fabrication changes reached a peak. Hardware modifi- 
cations, which are made in  order  to meet reliability requirements, not only delayed the 
completion of the qualification of each component, but necessitated a substantial amount 
of retesting with the heavyweight subsystem test rigs to determine if interactions would 
occur between major assemblies. The schedule also w a s  delayed by assembly and 
checkout of the first flight service propulsion subsystem and its subsequent failure be- 
cause of the structural collapse of the propellant-retention reservoir. By 1966, the 
subsystem configuration was completed and the program proceeded into the flight phase. 
The most significant lesson that w a s  learned from the service propulsion subsys- 
tem program w a s  the need to develop basic technology for  propulsion systems before 
initiating full-scale hardware designs. Besides the anticipated technical problems, 
such as engine performance and combustion instability, schedule delays were experi- 
enced during hardware development, and these delays generally were associated with 
the high reliability requirements of the Apollo Program and the lack of experience with 
the propellants and their effects on materials. Typical of these problems were 
propellant-tank s t r e s s  corrosion, deterioration of seals in  the tank doors and pressuri-  
zation components, limited engine bipropellant-valve-seal cycle life, and nitrogen 
tetroxide corrosion of aluminum parts. Although some studies had been conducted in  
selected areas, there was a lack of knowledge on the behavior of propellants in  zero 
gravity, on the mechanism of propellant ignition, on the effects of freezing and thermal 
decomposition of propellants, on ablative materials suitable for use in  reliable thrust 
chambers, and on data concerning the generation and effects of contamination. 
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